Planning and Local Government Law Update by Hetrick, Patrick K.
Planning and Local Government Law Update
Patrick K. Hetrick
Editor s note: This article is compiledfrom material presented by Professor Hetrick at a North Carolina
Bar Association Conference titled "Land Use Regulation and Planning. "
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCES: Court
Applies Specific Language of Exemption Over
Broad Construction of Statute
Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County
345 N.C. 468, 480 S.E.2d 681 (1997)
In this case from Harnett County, a developer
sought a declaratory judgment that a plat was exempt
from the count}' subdivision regulation. The developer
claimed that the plat was clearly exempt because G.S.
§ 153A-335(2) exempts from the statutory definition
of ''subdivision" the "division of land into parcels
greater than 10 acres if no street right-of-way
dedication is involved."
The plat divided the 230-acre parcel mto 23 lots,
some with private driveway easements. The county
subdivision administrator took the position that the
plat did not qualify for the exemption because access
to the lots for county services such as law enforcement
and fire or rescue operations would be prohibitive
and inadequate. The trial court judge agreed, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed.
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Orr noted
that Harnett County !s power to regulate subdivisions
is authorized and controlled by statutes. When a
statutory exemption is involved, interpretation begins
with an examination of the plam words of the statute.
Here, the statute provides an exemption for the division
of land into parcels greater than 10 acres if no street
right-of-way dedication is involved. Therefore, the
division of land by the plaintiffs was not subject to
any regulations enacted pursuant to Chapter 153A.
Patrick Hetrick is Dean and Professor of Law at
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The general statement of purpose in G.S. § 153A-
331 (to protect the public health, safely, and welfare)
and a mandate that Chapter 1 53A be construed broadly
should not control where the language of the more
specific exemption statute is so clear.
AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENT: Court
Finds County Cannot Purchase Property to
Transfer to State
Carter v. Stanly County
125 N.C.App. 628, 482 S.E.2d 9 (1997)
This case serves as a reminder that units of
government must act with statutory authority. In this
case, the simple issue is whether or not the county
can purchase privately-owned land and then give it to
the state as an enticement for the construction of a
state prison. Of course, those who opposed the
location of the prison in their community pursued
legal avenues to prevent it. In terms of general
enablmg legislation, the question centered on whether
the county's action was authorized by G.S. §§ 153A-
158 and 160A-274(b). Section 153A-158 reads, in part:
A county may acquire, by gift, grant, devise,
bequest, exchange, purchase, lease, or any other
lawful method, the fee or any lesser interest in real
or personal propertyfor use by the county or any
department, board, commission, or agency ofthe
county.
. . .
Section 160A-274(b) reads:
Any governmental unit may, upon such terms and
conditions as it deems wise, with or without
consideration, exchange with lease to, lease from.
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sell to, purchase from, or enter into agreements
regarding thejoint use by any other governmental
unit of any interest m real or personal property
that it may own.
The Court of Appeals rejected Stanly County's
argument that these two statutes, interpreted
expansively, authorize the county's purchase of
property for a state prison. Both statutes place a limit
on who may use the property purchased by the county.
Section 153A-158 requires use by the county or a
department, board, commission or agency of the
county. Section 160A-274(b) clearly refers to joint
use with any other governmental unit. Applying
"Dillon's Rule," the Court held that the plain language
ofboth statutes '"straightforwardly and unambiguously
demes the County authority to make this transfer "
After the institution ofthis suit, Stanly County had
a special statute passed by the General Assembly-
allowing it to acquire the land for a state prison.
ZONING: Fair Housing Act Applies to Zoning
Decisions
Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md.
9l'l F.Supp. 918 (D.Md. 1996)
Plaintiff (Bryant) operates two group homes
providing housing and other services in a non-
lnstitutional setting to elderly persons with disabilities.
Most of the residents suffer from Alzheimer's and
related disabilities. One of the group homes had been
used for up to eight residents. Plaintiff asked
appropriate state officials to approve the home for up
to fifteen residents. The state agencies involved denied
the request because zoning approval had not been
secured from the county zoning office. Zoning approval
was denied for several reasons, including the
intensified nature of the proposed use and parking
problems.
Plaintiffcommenced suit alleging violations ofthe
Fair Housing Act. (The FHA does not specifically
prohibit discrimmation against the elderly, so the theory
of the action was discrimination against the disabled.
Most of the elderly residents of the group home
suffered from mental disabilities.) The court granted
the government agencies' motion for summary-
judgment holding that (1) the government actions m
denying the expansion of the group home did not
constitute intentional discrimination against persons
with disabilities under the Fair Housing Law, (2) that
the plaintiff failed to state a viable claim under a
disparate impact theory, and (3) that the government
agencies had not failed to make reasonable
accommodations for persons with disabilities. Thus,
the court dismissed all possible theories ofviolation of
the FHA: ( 1 ) the theory of intentional discrimination
against persons with disabilities; (2) the theory of
disparate impact upon persons with disabilities; and,
(3) the theory of failure to make a "reasonable
accommodation"' for people with disabilities under the
FHA.
Citing Fourth Circuit decisions, the court noted
that state and local zoning and land use law is
particularly the province of the State. Federal courts,
therefore, should be wary of intervening in the area in
the ordinary case. Cases involving questions of state
and local land use and zoning law are classic examples
of situations in which the exercise of federal review-
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to matters of public
concern, and few matters of public concern are more
substantial than zoning and land use laws.
However, when issues of local land use law also
involve asserted causes of action under the Fair
Housing Act, federal courts must intervene because
that legislation provides direct federal relief for those
aggrieved by discnminatory land use decisions ofstate
and local governments. Fair Housing Act cases,
therefore, are not examples of federal courts
interfering with local law, nor are they examples of
federal courts sitting as a zoning board of appeals.
ZONING: Zoning Decisions Subject to
Scrutiny under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act
Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. White Plains,
N.Y.
U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
No. 96-7797 6/26/97
The first federal appellate court to address the
relationship between local zoning ordinances and
federal laws prohibiting discrimination against the
disabled has held that a zoning decision is subject to
scrutiny under both the Americans With Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973
.
In this case, the plaintiff desired to relocate an
outpatient drug and alcohol treatment center to a larger
facility in downtown White Plains. The initial
determination by a city official was that the proposed
use was consistent with the location's zoning
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classification. After significant opposition from other 
residents of the same building and from a nearby 
shopping mall, the Zoning Board of Appeals reversed 
the earlier decision. (Opponents had expressed 
concern for safety and a fear of falling property 
values.) 
· The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the trial court's determination that zoning 
decisions are covered activities ,vithin the purview of 
both Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 12132) and the Rehabilitation Act (29 
U.S.C. § 794(a)). The federal district court issued a 
preliminary injunction of the Zoning Board of Appeals' 
action based on the plaintiff's claim that the denial of 
 
a permit under these circumstances constituted illegal 
discrimination based on a disability. 
The Americans With Disabilities Act and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 invoke a sweeping series 
of civil rights protections for the disabled and can also 
have a significant impact in the right fact situation. In 
this case, for example, objections to the proposed 
outpatient drug and alcohol treatment center based 
on a general fear of the legally disabled patients who 
would use the center or based on a concern for 
decreasing property values would place this case in 
line with countless prior civil rights cases dealing with 
other targets of discrimination. CD 
 
